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Judicial Review of State Regulation
Which Impacts Foreign Trade: A Second Look a t
South-Central Timber Development v. Wunnicke

The paths followed by courts in resolving federal-state
regulatory conflicts have led the nation through its history of
federalism and have encircled the states' ability to intrude into
areas of national interest. Judicial resolution of commercial
regulatory conflicts between federal and state governments is
ultimately a question of constitutional concern. Article I section
8 of the Constitution gives Congress the power "[tlo regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States."' When Congress has acted within a field of foreign or
interstate commerce, the Constitution leaves little doubt that
the congressional action preempts state commercial regulation~.~
Courts are faced with a much more difficult problem, however, in reviewing state commercial regulations in the face of
~
congressional i n a ~ t i o n .When
legislative history is slim or
nonexistent, courts must predict the degree to which Congress
would have limited state power to regulate commerce.' In re1. U.S. CONST.art.1, $ 8, cl. 3.
2.
U.S. CONST.art.VI, $ 2 .
3. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). Justice Stewart explained:
Although the Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate commerce among the States, many subjects of potential federal regulation
under that power inevitably escape congressional attention "because of
their local charader and their number and diversity." In the absence of
federal legislation, these subjects are open to control by the States so
long as they act within the restraints imposed by the Commerce Clause
itself. The bounds of these restraints appear nowhere in the words of the
Commerce Clause, but have emerged gradually in the decisions of this
Court giving effect to its basic
Id. at 623 (quoting South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc.,
303 U.S. 177, 185 (1938)) (citations omitted).
4. Id. See also Thomas R. Powell, The Still Small Voice of the Commerce
ESSAYSON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 931-32 (1938).
Clause, in 3 A.A.L.S., SELECTED
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sponse to congressional inaction, the courts have developed a
self-executing rule of commerce known as the "dormant commerce clause" which defaults to a presupposed congressional
trade policy. Professors Hay and Rotunda explain that "[wlhen
the Court seeks to decide the extent of permissible state regulation in light of a 'dormant' Commerce Clause power, it is, in
effect, attempting to interpret the meaning of congressional silence when it intervenes in an area where the primary power is
that of Congre~s."~
In reviewing state intrusions into areas of congressional
silence, the courts have speculated that if Congress had acted,
it would have eliminated the states' ability to burden interstate
commerce. Under dormant commerce clause review, courts ask
if a state's action unduly burdens interstate commerce without
express authorization or without furthering a legitimate state
interest? Thus, state actions favoring intrastate trade over
interstate commerce are targets for dormant commerce clause
invalidation.
Differences between the national interests involved in interstate trade and those a t stake in foreign commerce present
reasons to criticize the application of a dormant commerce
clause analysis to state regulations which primarily impact
foreign trade. The dormant commerce clause preference for
unburdened trade is contrary to many of the nation's foreign
trade poli~ies.~
Furthermore, the fairness of the dormant commerce clause rule diminishes when it is applied to state actions
which impact foreign trade. Under the rule, states are required
to open their borders to foreign commerce without any assurance of reciprocal treatment from their foreign trading partner~.~
In reviewing state regulations which primarily impact foreign trade, courts should allow the states to exercise the full
measure of the regulatory power reserved them by the Constitution. In other words, the states should be allowed to regulate

5. PETERHAY& RONALDD. ROTUNDA,THE UNFTED
STATES
FEDERAL
SYSTEM:
EXPERIENCE
72 (1982).
LEGALINTEGRATION IN THE AMERICAN
6. See Baldwin v. G A F . Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935). A state statute is
invalid "when the avowed purpo& of the obstruction, as well as its necessary
tendency, is to suppress or %gate the mnseqyences of competition between the
states." Id. at 522.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 33-35.
8.
See infra text accompanying notes 36-40.
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foreign commerce concurrently with the federal government to
the extent that the action is not expressly prohibited by the
Constitution or by Congress.' In order to preserve the external
affairs power of the federal government, state regulatory power
should be limited to actions which are not contradictory or repugnant to national foreign policy.1° Under the concurrent
powers analysis, the validity of state commercial regulations
would not depend upon the magnitude of its discriminatory
effect. Rather, the regulation's validity would depend upon its
consistency with United States foreign trade policy.
CLAUSE
11. APPLICATIONOF THE DORMANTCOMMERCE

A. A Second Look at South-Central Timber Development
v. Wunnicke
The Supreme Court's decision in South-Central Timber
Development v. Wunnickel1illustrates the difficulties of applying the dormant commerce clause to state commercial regulations which primarily impact foreign trade. The conflict before
the Court in South-Central concerned the validity of an Alaskan administrative reg~lation'~which required all timber
purchased from state lands to undergo primary pro~essing'~
within Alaska prior to export from the state.14 The require-

See infra text accompanying notes 42-63.
See infia text accompanying notes 64-70.
467 U.S.82 (1984).
ALASKA ADMIN.CODE tit. 11, $5 71.230, 71.910 (1982).
The major method of complying with the primary-manufacture requirement is to convert the logs into cants, which are logs slabbed on at least
one side. In order to satisfy the Alaska requirement, cants must be either
sawed t o a maximum thickness of 12 inches or squared on four sides
along their entire length.
South-Central, 467 U.S.at 85.
14. Alaska is not alone in its attempt to regulate log exports. Oregon has
adopted a Joint Senate Resolution which imposes similar restrictions on log exports
from the State. The resolution was designed to recognize at least two things:
(2) [Tlhe importance of maintaining employment in local mills and community stability . . . .
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

....

(8) When a state exports logs instead of lumber, it is functioning similar
to the developing nations of the world that rely on their unprocessed
natural resources as a primary means of generating foreign exchange
revenue. By exporting raw material, we lose the value added by manufacturing, the jobs involved directly . . . and the related spin-off
jobs. . . .
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ment was intended to proted the state lumber industry, increase revenues from the state's timber resources, and manage
the state's forests.15 The regulation's effect was limited to contracts for timber taken from state lands and in no way inhibited contracts for privately owned timber?
The primary processing requirement was challenged17 by
South-Central Timber Development, a logging company dealing
almost exclusively with Japanese buyers .I8 South-Central
challenged the regulation on the grounds that the requirement
violated the "negative implications of the Commerce Cla~se."'~
The district court ruled in South-Central's favor and enjoined
the state from enforcing the primary processing reThe Ninth Circuit reversed, finding implicit conq~irernent.~'
gressional authorization in a similar federal regulation2' that

The resolution is to become "operative when federal law is enacted allowing this
state to exercise such authority or when a court or the Attorney General of this
state determines that such authority lawfully may be exercised." S.J. Res. 8, 65th
Leg., Reg. Sess., 1989 Or. Laws 2224.
To date, Oregon has not received authorization to implement its resolution, but
authorization from Congress may be forthcoming. In April of 1990, the "Senate
passed an amendment to a trade bill offered by Senator Bob Packwood, Republican
of Oregon, that would allow states to ban the export of logs. . . . A similar bill is
before the House, and prospects appear good for Congressional passage? Timothy
Egan, 10,000 Are Expected to Lose Jobs to Spotted Owl, N.Y.TIMES,Apr. 28, 1990,
0 1, at 8, col. 3.
15. South-Central, 467 U.S. at 85. Since Alaska's motivation for adopting the
primary processing requirement was to preserve an economic interest in its lumber
industry, the state could not claim that its statute was a proper use of its police
power to protect the health and safety of its citizens. See also infra text accompanying note 39.
16. For a discussion of the applicability of the commerce clause to state-owned
natural resources see, Thomas K. Anson & P. M. Schenkkan, Federalism, the
Dormant Commerce Clause, and State-Owned Resources, 59 TM.L. REV. 71 (1980)
(explaining that state regulations designed to proted state-owned natural resources
should be valid unless expressly invalidated by Congress).
17. South-Central, 467 U.S. 82. The suit arose when South-Central learned that
the Alaska Department of Natural Resources announced that it would sell 49
million board feet of timber in the area of Icy Cape, Alaska on October 23, 1980
and that the primary processing requirement would be part of the contract. Id. at
84-87.
18. Id. at 85 n.4. The majority noted that Alaska does not have an interstate
timber trade. Practically all of its timber is sold abroad and at least 90% of the
timber is exported to Japan. Id.
19. Id. at 86 n.5.
20.
South-Central Timber Dev. v. LeResche, 511 F. Supp. 139, 144 (D.Alaska
1981), rev'd, 693 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom., South-Central Timber
Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
21. Unprocessed timber from National Forest System lands in Alaska may
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requires primary processing of all timber taken from federal
lands in Alaska? The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit's decision. The Court held that the parallel federal primary processing requirement did not implicitly authorize Alaska to impose its own requirement on state owned timber.23
The Court applied the dormant commerce clause and concluded
that the regulation unduly burdened commerce and, thus, without express authorizationU from Congress, violated the negative implications of the commerce clause?

B. The Dormant Commerce Clause and Foreign Trade
The Court in South-Central failed to recognize that the
dormant commerce clause is imbued with policies unique to
domestic trade and should not be readily applied to matters of
foreign commerce. The rule developed largely in response to
individual state attempts to exploit trade among neighboring

not be exported from the United States or shipped to other States without prior approval of the Regional Forester. This requirement is necessary
to ensure the development and continued existence of adequate wood
processing capacity in that State for the sustained utilization of timber
from the National Forests which are geographically isolated from other
processing facilities.
36 C.F.R. 8 223.161 (1990) (in effect since 1928).
The federal government has in the past sought to limit access to federally
owned forests in a variety of ways. From 1969 to 1973, Congress imposed a maximum export limitation of 350 million board-feet of unprocessed timber from federal
lands lying west of the 100th meridian. See 16 U.S.C. 8 617(a) (1988).
South-Central Timber Dev. v. LeResche, 693 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1982),
22.
rev'd sub mm., South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
South-Central, 467 U.S. at 87-93.
23.
24.
The Supreme Court noted:
On those occasions in which consent has been found, congressional
intent and policy to insulate state legislation from Commerce Clause attack have been "expressly stated. . . ." There is no talismanic significance
to the phrase "expressly stated" however; it merely states one way of
meeting the requirement that for a state regulation to be removed from
the reach of the dormant Commerce Clause, congressional intent must be
unmistakably clear.
Id. at 90-91 (citations omitted).
25.
Id. at 99-101. A plurality of the Court also rejected Alaska's contention that
it merely imposed the primary processing requirement as a market participant and
not in any regulatory capacity. The plurality reasoned that Alaska's conduct could
not acceptably fall within the market participation exception to the commerce
clause since the requirement imposed significant downstream effects on commerce.
Id. at 93-99 (plurality opinion).
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states.26 In Hughes v. Oklahoma,2' the Supreme Court explained that the commerce clause was designed "to avoid the
tendencies toward economic Balkinization that had plagued
relations among the Colonies and later among the States under
the Articles of Confederati~n."~~
The Court elsewhere explained another purpose of the
commerce clause:
"When the regulation is of such a character that its burden
falls principally upon those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints
which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects
adversely some interests within the state."On the other hand,
when Congress acts, all segments of the country are represented, and there is significantly less danger that one State
will be in a position to exploit others?'

Thus the commerce clause allows Congress to promote economic fairness by ensuring representation of local interests and by
providing an even playing field that subjects all participants to
the same rules of commerce.30While this set of objectives resonates well with our system of domestic trade and government,
the realities of foreign trade policy require a distinction between national and interstate borders.
1. Harmony between federal and state trade regulations

In South-Central, the Supreme Court required Alaska t o
export raw logs from state lands despite the long established
federal primary processing requirement. In reaching its decision, the plurality reasoned, "It is crucial to the efficient execution of the Nation's foreign policy that 'the Federal Government . . . speak with one voice when regulating commercial
relations with foreign governments.' "31
The Court's decision created the opposite effect. Instead of
26.

See Edmund W. Kitch, Regulation and the American Common Market, in
INTERSTATE COMMERCE 9, 21 (A. Dan Tarlock ed.,

REGULATION,FEDERALISM,
AND

1981).
27.
441 U.S. 322 (1979).
Id. at 325.
28.
29.
South-Central, 467 U.S.at 92 (quoting South Carolina State Highway Dep't
v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 185, n.2 (1938)).
30.
See id.
31.
Id. at 100 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976))
(plurality opinion).

'
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presenting foreign buyers with a uniform log export policy, the
Cour4t3s decision created a dual policy. Foreign buyers may
now purchase raw logs from private and state-owned lands but
only processed lumber from federal lands. This fragmented
policy illustrates the weakness of the dormant commerce clause
"as a self-executing limitation on the power of the States to
enact laws imposing substantial burdens on . . . commerce."32
The Court's decision should not have rested solely upon the
magnitude of the regulation's discriminatory effect on foreign
trade. Rather, the Court could have reached a much more coherent result had it reviewed the validity of Alaska's regulation
on the basis of its consistency with federal regulations and
foreign trade policies.
2. International commerce and'fkee trade preferences
For a variety of security and economic reasons, many
Americans have welcomed governmental intervention into
foreign import and export markets.33 Reflecting these sentiments, the United States does not have an established preference for free international trade. Instead, Americans have approached uninhibited international trade with a great deal of
caution and concern.
Dormant commerce clause analysis does not entertain
these concerns but is instead biased in favor of free trade. Often, national interests in noneconomic foreign policy shape
~ this regard, even state regulations
foreign trade p o l i ~ y ?In
that facilitate foreign commerce can do damage to national forId. at 87.
Arguments for governmental intervention in foreign commerce include the
need for:
1. protection against dumping practices,
2. protection against foreign export subsidies,
3. protection of infant industries,
4. protection of domestic jobs,
5. promotion of industry vital to the national defense,
6. improved terms of trade,
7. diversification of domestic industry.
& PAULR. GREGORY,
PRINCIPLES
OF ECONOMICS
458-65 (2nd ed.
ROY R U F F I N
32.
33.

1985).
34.
See generally C
~ W. KEGLEY,
S
JR. & EUGENER. W~ITKOPF,
WORLD
POLITICSTRENDAND TRANSFORMATION
(1985) "[Llinkage concept meads] that the

entire range of [foreign]-American relations [are] interdependent and that therefore
concessions in any one problem area could and must be compensated for by roughly equivalent concessions in others." Id. at 58.
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eign policies if the trading partner has been disfavored or if the
traded goods are sensitive to vital security interests. For exarnple, in the summer of 1989, the efforts of Governor Guy Hunt
to establish a trade agreement between Alabama and the
Hubei Province in central China were threatened when President Bush considered economic sanctions in response to the
military suppression of Chinese protestor^.'^
3. Fora and fairness
Under the commerce clause, congressional power to act in
regulating foreign and interstate trade to the exclusion of state
regulatory power is clear and ~ n q u e s t i o n e d .Though
~~
the
states must subordinate to federal regulation, they are usually
not left without a voice in the policy decisions that affect them.
Local interests participate in congressional regulatory actions
via their elected representatives, through whom they are able
to exert a measure of influence upon national trade policy. The
system of representation breaks down, however, when Congress
does not act in a field of local concern. Congressional inaction
forms an important dimension of national trade policy and
often affects state interests as much as an affirmative intrusion
into local matter^.^' When Congress is silent, it implicitly rejects active state participation in national policy-making. The
federal government's exclusive power under the Constitution t o
negotiate and make treaties with foreign nations further limits
the states' ability t o seek redress for alleged economic harm in
international fora?'
The dormant commerce clause also restricts the states'
ability to represent their own economic interests in an alternative judicial forum. Under the commerce clause, a state may
regulate commerce without congressional authority when the
action is a valid exercise of the state's police power.3g Howev-

35.
See Dana Beyerle, Alabama Adopts Wait, See Attitude on Beijing, UPI, June
5, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES file.
36.
See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
37.
See, e.g., Powell, supra note 4.
38.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, $ 10.
39.
See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U S . 137 (1970) (stating that
where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effeduate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effeds on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits). See also Hunt v. Washington State Apple
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er, actions motivated primarily to protect state economic interests are outside the state's police power and are invalid under
the commerce clause. Consequently, states are effectively
barred from judicial fora in protecting legitimate economic
interests.
Lack of state participation in all matters of domestic commerce is not critical. When the dormant commerce clause is
uniformly applied to all states, the even application serves as a
proxy for state participation in a national forum. In return for
the restrictions placed on state freedom to exploit interstate
trade, the commerce clause ensures each state protection from
the opportunistic behavior of neighboring s t a t e d 0 In this
manner, interstate fairness is achieved not through a system of
active state participation in national fora but rather through
the uniform application of a domestic trade policy under the
commerce clause.
The commerce clause fails as an adequate proxy for state
representation in matters touching foreign trade. When Congress is silent in areas sensitive to state economic interests, the
states are left with neither active representation in national
and international fora nor adequate protection. Though the
dormant commerce clause prohibits state actions that unduly
burden foreign commerce, it does not require foreign countries
to reciprocate the benefits of unfettered trade extended by their
state trading partners.
Dormant commerce clause review of state actions that
impact foreign trade may potentially extend the benefits and
protections of the commerce clause to foreign trading partners
a t the expense of legitimate state economic interests. It is
doubtfd that the framers of the Constitution intended to subjugate valid state interests t o those of foreign nations.

Since the courts cannot ensure that foreign trading partners will treat the states fairly, the states should be allowed to

Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell,
424 U.S. 366 (1976); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
40. See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935). The Court
heid, "[Olne state in its dealings with another may not place itself in a position of
economic isolation." Id. at 527.
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exert the full measure of their regulatory powers reserved under the Constitution. Professor Kallenbach explains that the
drafters of the commerce clause contemplated a system of concurrent powers that would not wholly deprive states of the
ability to influence commerce:
So far as the commerce clause was concerned, there was
nothing in the history of its adoption in the Convention that
gave any clear indication that the framers regarded it as
confemng an exclusive power on Congress. . . . In vesting
control over interstate commerce in Congress the principal
objective was the prevention of trade restraints, which, if
permitted to continue, would disrupt the nation's internal
commerce and lead to disunion. . . .

....

The conclusion seems warranted that it was generally
held by members of the Convention that the grant of the commerce power to Congress did not in itself deprive the states of
authority to legislate on matters relating to commerce, but
that positive action by Congress under the grant was necessary to control such state legi~lation.~'

Though the commerce clause provides a system of concurrent powers between the federal and state governments, it fails
to delineate clearly the scope of permissible state regulatory
powers. Alexander Hamilton outlined three factors that would
preclude the exercise of concurrent state regulatory power. He
wrote:
An entire consolidation of the States into one complete
national sovereignty would imply an entire subordination of
the parts; and whatever powers might remain in them, would
be altogether dependent on the general will. But as the plan
of the [constitutionall convention aims only at a partial union
or consolidation, the State governments would clearly retain
all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which
were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United
States. This exclusive delegation, or rather this alienation, of
State sovereignty, would only exist in three cases: where the
Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive authority
to the Union; where it granted in one instance an authority to
the Union, and in another prohibited the States from exercis-

41.

JOSEPHE. KALLENBAcH,FEDERAL
COOPERATION
WITH THE STATES UNDER

THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE 10, 14 (1968) (citations omitted).
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ing the like authority; and where it granted an authority to
the Union, to which a similar authority in the States would
be absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant .'2

Hamilton's test for state concurrent power can be divided
into two parts: a power prong and a scope prong. Under the
power prong, states may exercise concurrent regulatory power
with Congress unless the Constitution has granted Congress
exclusive power or unless the Constitution prohibits concurrent
state power in a regulatory field. Under the scope prong, state
regulatory powers are limited to actions that are neither repugnant nor contradictory to congressional authority.
A. Power Prong

I . Express terms
Under Hamilton's test, the states are precluded from exercising commercial regulatory powers if the Constitution grants
exclusive regulatory powers to the federal government. Article I
of the Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate interstate and foreign trade but stops short of excluding the states
from exerting similar powers. As the Supreme Court pointed
out in Goldstein v. Calif0rnia,4~the mere grant of power to
Congress by the Constitution is not itself enough to deprive the
states of concurrent powers. In Goldstein, the Court upheld a
California statute that provided state copyright protection t o
sound recordings." The Court concluded that Article I does
not grant Congress the exclusive power t o establish copyright
law?
In limited settings, the Supreme Court has historically
recognized state authority to regulate commerce. In Gibbons v.
Ogden,'s the Court explained that states enjoy a limited scope
of power but stopped short of denying states any concurrent
powers.'" Later, in Cooky v. Board of Wardensf the Court
42.
THE FEDERALIST
NO. 32, at 241 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright
ed., 1961) (emphasis added).
43.
412 U.S. 546 (1973).
Id.
44.
45.
Id. at 552-61 (Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, does not expressly or by
inference vest all power to grant copyright protection exclusively in the Federal
Government).
46.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
47. Id. (limiting the states to the exercise of their police power in regulating
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affirmed that the "mere grant to Congress of the power to regulate commerce, did not deprive the States of the power to regulate pilots" of ships bound for foreign ports.'g There, the Court
preserved concurrent state regulatory powers by adopting a
rule of "selective exclusiveness" which focused upon the subject
matter of the challenged regulation rather than the nature of
the exercised power.50 The Court distinguished between subjects of commerce that require uniform treatment and subjects
of local interest warranting a diversity of treatment? Under
the Cooley rule, Congress has exclusive power over subjects
which require uniform treatment but only concurrent power
with the states over matters of local interest.52
Though the Cooky doctrine presented an appealing dichotomy between local and national interests, the rule proved to be
unworkable. Some doubt existed that courts could properly
distinguish between matters of local and national interest as
well as a fear that state regulation of local concerns would lead
to commercial discrimination among the states.53 To date, the
Supreme Court has not overruled Cooky, but "it has exhibited
a tendency to rely less frequently upon the local-concurrentpowers concept and more upon a broader view of state police
and revenue powers as a basis for upholding state acts relating
to interstate and foreign commer~e."~

commerce); see also supra text accompanying note 34.
53 U.S.(12 How.) 299 (1851).
48.
49.
Id. at 320.
50. Id. at 318-21.
51. Id.
52.
Id. Attorney General Wirt ibst proposed this rule in Gibbons when he
argued:
Some subjects are, in their nature, extremely multifarious and complex. The same subject may consist of a great variety of branches, each
extending itself into remote, minute and infiite ramifications. One branch
alone, of such a subject, might be given exclusively to Congress, yet, on
other branches of the same subject, the States might act, without interfering with the power exclusively granted to Congress. Commerce is such a
subject. It is so complex, multifarious and indefinite that it would be
extremely dieticult, if not impracticable, to make a digest of all the operations which belong to it. One or more branches of this subject might be
given exclusively to Congress; the others may be left open to the States.
They may, therefore, legislate on commerce, though they cannot touch
that branch which is given exclusively to Congress.
Gibbons, 22 U.S.(9 Wheat.) at 165.
53. See HAY & ROTUNDA,supm note 5, at 82.
54. KALLENBACH,supra note 41, at 45.
'
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2. Granted and prohibited powers
Hamilton noted that a power reserved for the states in one
part of the Constitution could be limited or denied by other
sections of the Con~titution.6~
Article I, Section 10 is a prorninent example of a constitutional limitation on the powers of
states to deal with foreign trading partners. The section provides, in part, that "[nlo State shall enter into any Treaty,
Alliance, or Confederation," or "without the Consent of the
Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or E ~ p o r t s . " ~ ~
The external affairs power is perhaps the broadest limitation on the states' power to influence their relationships with
foreign trading partners. The Supreme Court explained that
"[plower over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is
vested in the national government excl~sively."~'
Di Santo v. P e n n s y l ~ a n i ais~ ~one of the first Supreme
Court cases to hold that state attempts to influence foreign
commerce were per se violations of the federal external affairs
power." Justice Stone's dissenting opinion in Di Santo has
done much to soften the majority's rigid approach to state intrusions into foreign commerce.60In his opinion, Justice Stone
reminded the majority that "the purpose of the commerce
clause was not to preclude all state regulation of commerce
crossing state lines, but to prevent discrimination and the erection of barriers or obstacles to the free flow of commerce, interstate or foreign?
Relying on Stone's dissenting opinion, Professor Dowling
later wrote that "the dormant commerce clause's unreasonable
burden test implicitly requires application of the Cooley doctrine, i.e., deliberately balancing national and local interests
and making a choice as to which should prevail."62 Accord-

See supra text accompanying note 42.
U.S. CON=. art. I, 8 10.
United States v. Pink, 315 US. 203, 233 (1942). See also Michelin Tire
v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
58.
273 U.S. 34 (1927), overruled by California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 116
(1940).
59.
Id. at 37.
60.
Cf. JOHN E. NOW& ET AL., C O N S T ~ I O N ALAW
L 274 (2d ed. 1983).
61. Di Santo v. Pe~sylvania,273 U.S. 34, 43-44 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting).
62. Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REV. 1,
21 (1940).
55.
56.
57.
Corp.
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ingly, the external affairs interest a t stake in foreign commerce
should not form the basis of absolute preemption of state regulations that impact foreign trade. Rather, courts should consider the external affairs interest as one factor, inter aliu, limiting
the permissible scope of state regulatory powers.63
B. Scope Prong
Hamilton explained that states should be given the ability
t o regulate commerce to the extent that the state exercise of
power is not "absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant" to a power granted the union." Limiting the scope of
state power in this manner allows the states to exercise the full
measure of their regulatory powers without hampering the
supremacy of the federal government in controlling interstate
and foreign trade. Hamilton's Ucontradictoryand repugnant"
test has been judicially developed under the Supremacy Clause
of the Con~titution.~~
The purpose of Supremacy Clause analysis is to prohibit
individual states from frustrating the exercise of congressional
power.66 Under the Supremacy Clause, a state's exercise of
regulatory power is void if it "collides" with a federal exercise of
power." The Supreme Court explained in Goldstein that care
must be given "to distinguish those situations in which the
concurrent exercise of a power by the Federal Government and
the States or by the States alone may possibly lead to conflicts
and those situations where conflicts will necessarily arise."68
A court may also invalidate state actions if it finds evidence of congressional intent to "occupy the field of regula-

cf

63.
64.
65.

NoWAK ET AL., supra note 60 at 274-275.
THE FEDERALIST,
supra note 42 at 261.
US. C o ~ s r art.
.
VI, 0 2.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be

made in Pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
66.
Co. v.
67.
68.

See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S.238 (1984); Pacific Gas & Elec.
State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
Id.
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 554 (1973) (emphasis in original).
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ti~n."~
Typically, courts will not find congressional intent t o
occupy a field of regulation unless Congress has clearly expressed its intention to abrogate state regulation of the field or
unless the court. can imply that intention from a pervasive
congressional regulatory scheme." Accordingly, the scope of
state regulatory powers should be limited to avoid conflicts
with existing legislation and collisions with Congress' external
affairs powers.

IV. ADVANTAGES
OF LIMITED
CONCURRENT
STATEPOWERS
The dormant commerce clause was developed to interpret
congressional silence in matters concerning domestic trade.
However, foreign trade issues are often complex and involve a
variety of noneconomic policy considerations. Concurrent powers analysis allows the courts to base their decisions firmly
upon a review of all relevant local and national concerns.
As illustrated by the Supreme Court's decision in SouthCentral, strict application of the dormant commerce clause can
diminish rather than enhance the uniformity of national trade
policy. The dormant commerce clause blinded the Court to the
fact that Congress had an established primary processing requirement for all logs taken from federal lands. In striking
down Alaska's primary processing requirement, the Court gave
more deference to its own judicially created free trade policy
than to a national policy that had sought for several years to
protect both the local processing industry and the nation's
timber supply.
The dormant commerce clause favors free trade to the
exclusion of many important policy concerns. Congress has
historically acted to preserve local industries through protective
trade practices. This protection has often been justified by the
need to preserve industries vital to national defense, protect
jobs, and promote fairness by retaliating against foreign export
subsidies and d~mping.'~Furthermore, the United States'
trade policy is often inexorably linked to diplomatic concerns
that place foreign trading partners in a disfavored status.72

69. See generally Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
70. See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 US. 519 (1977); Northern Natural
Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84 (1963).
71. See RUFFIN& GREGORY,
supra note 33.
72. See KEGLEY & WITTKOPF,supra note 34.
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The concurrent powers analysis allows courts to consider the
validity of state actions on the basis of their consistency with
national trade and foreign policy.
Concurrent powers analysis further provides a state with
representation in a judicial forum in two instances: first, when
congressional silence implicitly bars active representation in
Congress and, second, when the commerce clause fails t o protect the state from its foreign trading partner. The commerce
clause limits state power over foreign commerce to the exercise
of its police power. The broader concurrent powers analysis
allows the states to regulate beyond their police power as long
as the Constitution does not prohibit state action or the state
action does not collide with congressional regulations or policies. Under this broader scope of review, a state is allowed to
admit that its regulatory efforts are aimed at protecting local
economic interests. However, the states carry the burden of
showing that their actions are consistent with an existing congressional regulatory scheme. The advantages provided by
broader state powers ensure that states will not be forced to
extend the benefits of free trade to foreign trading partners
without promise of reciprocity or adequate representation in a
decision-making forum.

V. APPLICATION OF CONCURRENT
POWERSANALYSISTO
South-Central
The concurrent powers analysis would have allowed the
Court in South-Central to travel a more favorable path in reviewing Alaska's log export policy. Unburdened by the dormant
commerce clause, the Court could have considered the validity
of Alaska's regulation in light of all policy concerns and could
have effectively balanced the state's interest in preserving its
local lumber industry with the federal interest in maintaining
a uniform national trade policy.
The first step in reviewing Alaska's primary processing
requirement under the concurrent powers analysis requires the
state to establish that the regulation's burden falls primarily
upon foreign trading partners. Alaska could have easily met
the foreign commerce requirement. The Court in South-Central
pointed out that Alaska does not have an interstate timber
trade. Almost all of Alaska's timber is exported abroad and at
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least ninety percent of the timber is exported t o Japan.73
A court might invalidate Alaska's regulation if it found the
requirement "repugnant" to a national interest. The Goldstein
Court explained that state regulations are repugnant when
they attempt to exercise powers which Congress has reserved
exclusively for itself or when the state's exercise of power will
necessari1y conflict with congressional power or policy." The
Court in South-Central described Alaska's regulation as "parallel" with the federal requirement. The state requirement was
no more stringent than the long established federal practice.
The consistency between the two regulations suggests that it is
unlikely that a court would find a necessary collision between
the federal and state regulations.
A court applying the concurrent powers analysis to the
facts of South-Central would next have to determine whether
Congress had intended t o occupy the field of log export regulation. The federal primary processing requirement is silent as t o
Congress' intent to regulate timber from nonfederal lands.75
Since the congressional regulation was limited t o timber taken
from federal lands and in no way controlled timber exports
from state and private lands, it is doubtful that a court would
find congressional intent to occupy the entire field of log exports.
The facts of South-Central do not imply a collision with the
federal government's external affairs powers. The consistency
of the Alaskan administrative rule with the federal rule would
allow a reviewing court to conclude that Alaska's regulation
enhances rather than diminishes the uniformity of federal
timber policy in the Northwest. Application of the concurrent
powers test to the facts of South-Central reveals that a court
could reasonably overturn the majority's decision without injuring the federal interest in a uniform trade policy.

VI. CONCLUSION
The growing importance of foreign trade to individual state
economies increases the likelihood that the states will intervene to obtain favorable terms of trade and t o protect local
economic interests. States' attempts to regulate their own com73.
74.
75.

South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 85 n.4 (1984).
See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.

See 36 C.F.R. 5 223.161 (1990).
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mercial activities with foreign trading partners will call upon
the courts to redefine the relationship between federal and
state government. The path that courts choose in reviewing
state actions which impact foreign commerce will not only affect the future of federalism in the United States but will also
demarcate the states' ability to maximize the benefits of foreign
trade. The dormant commerce clause offers courts a narrow
course of review and is ill-suited to encompass the complexities
of foreign trade. Alternatively, the concurrent powers test
clears the path by allowing the courts to consider all local and
national concerns in reviewing state commercial regulations
which impact foreign trade.
York Moody Faulkner

